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sector organisation as it is to a private sector organisation. This paper
reviews the profile of directors on governance boards of government
controlled organisations and finds that, while the governance structures
are similar with those in the private sector, the real power to set the
strategic, financial and operational directions of these organisations is
not in the hands of the directors, as it is in the private sector, but in the
hands of the responsible ministers. This de-coupling, it is argued, is due
to the perception that private sector governance practices are superior to
public sector practices and therefore these government organisations, in
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Introduction
The Australian public sector has undergone significant changes since
the late 1980s. Many of these changes can be viewed as responses to
both internal and external institutional pressures to adopt private sector
behaviours, processes and values in an attempt to appear legitimate to
the people of Australia and [more importantly?] to the businesses which
operate in Australia.
Consistent with the private sector, the Australian Commonwealth
Government has significantly increased its focus on corporate
governance arrangements for Government, government departments,
agencies, and statutory authorities. For the Commonwealth Public
Sector, corporate governance refers to “the processes by which
organisations are directed, controlled and held to account.
It
encompasses authority, accountability, stewardship, leadership,
direction and control exercised in the organisation” (ANAO, 2003a, p. 6).
This definition of public sector corporate governance is supported by
Uhrig, who in his 2003 report1 explained that corporate governance is
concerned with “the power of those in control of the strategy and
direction of an entity … taking into account risk and the environment in
which it is operating” (2003, p. 2).
The Australian system of government is based upon the Westminster
system, which originated in the United Kingdom, where the head of state
is not the head of government, and the ministers from the governing
political party, the executive, are from and accountable to the parliament
(APH, 2003). This paper will focus on one component of executive
accountability to the parliament, the non-executive directors of the
government-controlled Commonwealth Statutory Authorities. The 2005–
06 Annual Reports of 19 material2 Commonwealth Statutory Authorities

1

The Uhrig Report was based on a review of the corporate governance of
Commonwealth Statutory Authorities and office holders. The objective of the
review was to identify issues surrounding existing governance arrangements and
to provide options for Government, both to improve performance and to get the
best from statutory authorities, office holders, and their accountability
frameworks. For a list of the recommendations of the Uhrig Report refer to
appendix 2.

2

Material entities comprise 99% of revenues, expenses, assets and liabilities of all
the Commonwealth Statutory Authorities (DOFA, 2007).
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were reviewed to determine the following: mix of executive and nonexecutive directors; gender of directors; highest level of qualification of
directors; average length of service of directors; remuneration of nonexecutive directors; and number of other directorships. The findings are
then reviewed in the context of the new managerialism environment
which is engulfing the Australian Commonwealth public service.
This paper examines the roles and mix of public sector non-executive
directors through the lens of institutional theory. Institutional theory has
often been used to explain how private sector organisations react to
socially rationalised concepts on the practices, procedures and
structures of organisations.
However, with the recent focus on
performance, efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector,
institutional theory is becoming more appropriate in the evaluation of
public sector organisations.

Background
The corporate governance structures of both public and private sectors
have areas of commonality (Edwards, 2002, p. 52), particularly in
relation to performance and the roles and responsibilities of their
governing boards and executive. For example the governing boards of
organisations in both sectors include executive directors (directors who
hold executive positions within the organisation) and non-executive
directors (who come from outside the organisation). For the public
sector the increased focus on performance and responsibilities is
consistent with the move to “new managerialism” in the public sector
(Jackson and Lapsley, 2003, p. 360) and the perceived need of the
public sector to improve its efficiency, effectiveness and accountability
(Guthrie, 1998, p. 2; Barton, 2005, p. 138). Dr Peter Boxall, the previous
Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of Finance and
Administration, explained the main objectives of new managerialism as
encouraging a culture of performance and making the public sector more
responsive to the needs of government (Boxall, 1998, p. 18). These
comments imply that the public sector before “new managerialism” was
inefficient and unresponsive to the needs of the government and in turn
unresponsive to the needs of the Australian public. This follows from the
common misconception that the best way for the public sector to
improve its performance would be to adopt private sector behaviours

3
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such as appointing governing boards of directors for some government
organisations.
One of the key processes required to develop an effective corporate
governance structure in any organisation is the clarification of
appropriate roles for management and for the board of directors (ASX,
2003, p. 3). While the roles and powers of directors on public sector
boards appear similar to those of directors on private sector boards,
there are fundamental differences. The most significant difference is in
relation to the level of power the directors have to act. Directors on the
board of a private sector company usually have both the full power to act
and the responsibility to do so. This includes the power to formulate and
approve the strategy of the organisation and to develop and implement
important company policies (Uhrig, 2003, p. 4).
In contrast, a board [and its directors] governing a public sector
organisation has limited power, primarily because government
organisations are created for the implementation of established
government policy and the realisation of intended outcomes (Uhrig,
2003, p. 31). The real power in a public sector organisation rests not
with the board of directors, but with the responsible Minister who controls
the appointment of board members, therefore influencing their behaviour
and reducing the autonomy of boards (Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005,
p. 60).
Regardless of the level of power and autonomy of public sector boards,
they still need to ensure the corporate governance structures of their
organisations enable them to effectively meet their responsibilities to
their key stakeholders: Parliament, Government [particularly via the
Departments of Finance and Administration, Treasury and Prime
Minister and Cabinet], Ministers, public service officers and the
Australian public. To assist, the Australian National Audit Office has
developed comprehensive Better Practice Guides for use amongst the
public sector3.
These guides outline explicitly the frameworks,

3

There is also specific legislation developed for Commonwealth Government
entities which prescribes the required processes and functions that affect the
governance of these entities. This specific legislation includes [do these acts
need to be in italics?] the Auditor-General Act 1997, the Public Service Act 1999
(PS Act), the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act), the

4
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processes and practices government organisations should take to
ensure their corporate governance arrangements meet the expectations
of their key stakeholders and effectively discharge their accountabilities.
Two specific pieces of legislation have been enacted to outline the
financial reporting requirements and financial accountabilities for
Commonwealth government organisations. The first, the Financial
Management and Accountability Act 1997, provides the “framework for
the proper management of public money and public property by the
Executive arm of the Commonwealth” (DOFA, 2006). The second, the
Commonwealth Authorities and Corporations Act 1997, “regulates
certain aspects of the corporate governance, financial management and
reporting of Commonwealth authorities, which are in addition to the
requirements of their enabling legislation; and the corporate governance
and reporting of Commonwealth companies which are in addition to the
requirements of the Corporations Act 2001” (DOFA, 2005).
This paper refers to the Australian National Audit Office’s Better Practice
Guidelines, along with a number of other Australian and international
documents and reports on corporate governance. For example, the
Higgs Report4 2003, based on the United Kingdom context, is
considered to be of particular relevance as it was written specifically for
the guidance of non-executive directors. This paper also refers to the
Uhrig report 2003 and the ASX5 Corporate Governance Council
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice
Recommendations. The paper then discusses the various sections of
the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997, the primary
legislation for Commonwealth Statutory Authorities. Following this
discussion the paper focuses on institutional theory, the theoretical lens
used to analyse the empirical data. The empirical data comprises an
analysis of the board composition of 19 Commonwealth Statutory

Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC Act) and the
Corporations Act 2001 (ANAO 2003a, p.10).

4

In April 2002 the UK Secretary of State and the Chancellor appointed Derek
Higgs to lead a short independent review of the role and effectiveness of nonexecutive directors.

5

Australian Stock Exchange
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Authorities according to certain key criteria. The paper concludes with a
summary of this initial research and outlines possible future areas for
research.

Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (CAC
Act)
The Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 was
developed to regulate the financial reporting and accountability of
Commonwealth Statutory Authorities (referred to as CSAs for the
remainder of this paper) and Commonwealth Companies (referred to as
CCs for the remainder of this paper). CSAs are body corporates
incorporated for a public purpose by an Act or by regulations under an
Act (CAC Act, ss.7) that hold money on their own account and are
separate legal entities to the Commonwealth. CCs are Corporations Act
20016 companies in which the Commonwealth has a controlling interest
(ss.34).
The creation of CSAs and CCs is based on various decisions made by
government to operate government-controlled entities “outside a
traditional departmental structure” (Uhrig, 2003 p. 16). To ensure these
detached organisations operate effectively and in line with government
expectations, the majority of CSAs have a governing body such as a
council or board where the members are defined as directors (CAC Act,
ss.5). These directors are selected and appointed by the responsible
Minister and their role is rather more complex than the role of directors of
private sector organisations. CSA directors are subject to the specific
requirements for directors of private sector companies outlined in the
Corporations Act 2001. For example, section 27E of the CAC Act 1997
states:
If the directors of a Commonwealth authority delegate a power
under its enabling legislation, a director is responsible for the

6

The Corporations Act 2001 is the principal legislation regulating companies in
Australia. It regulates matters such as the formation and operation of companies,
duties of officers, takeovers and fundraising (APLA, 2007)
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exercise of the power by the delegate as if the power had been
exercised by the directors themselves.
This is comparable to section 198D of the Corporations Act 2001:
The directors of a company may delegate any of their powers ...
the exercise of the power by the delegate is as effective as if the
directors had exercised it.
The directors of a CSA are required to prepare an annual report that is
tabled in Parliament and forwarded to the responsible Minister (CAC Act
1997, ss.9). In addition, they are also required to prepare budget
estimates for each financial year (ss.14). These budget estimates
contain the proposed annual expenditure of the CSA required to achieve
the Government-agreed organisational outcomes and are published in
Portfolio Budget Statements. The Portfolio Budget Statements are
referred, via the Government, to one of the Senate’s legislation
committees for examination and report. The legislation committees’
scrutiny of the estimates provides an opportunity for the Senate to
assess the performance of the public service and its administration of
government policy and programs (Evans, 2004). The review of the
budget estimates is one of the most important accountability functions of
the Parliament. Therefore the directors must not fail to provide the
responsible Minister with the budget estimates, in the format specified by
the Department of Finance and Deregulation, and by the required
deadline.
Consistent with the requirements for directors of private sector
companies under the Corporations Act 2001, the directors of CSAs are
legally required to ensure the financial statements of the organisation
are audited by an appropriately qualified auditor. However the directors
of a CSA do not have the authority to choose an auditor; rather:
… the directors of a Commonwealth authority must do whatever is
necessary to ensure that all relevant subsidiary’s financial
statements are audited by the Auditor-General. (ss.12.1)
In support of this requirement the CAC Act 1997 (ss.12.3) states that the
Auditor-General must provide a copy of the audit report for the
responsible Minister.
While directors of both private and public sector entities have
fundamental differences, they do have similar duties as required by the
7

Volume 14, Number 1, 2008

Accounting, Accountability & Performance

legislation governing corporations. The next section of the paper will
use institutional theory to examine some of these similarities and explore
some of the differences.

Institutional Pressures on Public Sector Governance
Along with the move to “new managerialism”, public sector organisations
are now under increased pressures “to conform to external expectations
about what forms or structures are acceptable (or legitimate)” (Hoque,
2005, p. 370). The introduction of a governing board of directors in
CSAs to ‘improve’ their corporate governance is in response to external
expectations [institutional pressures] to ensure that the public sector
organisations can remain, or at least be seen to be, legitimate within
Australian society.
The institutional pressures which result in organisations changing and
adopting structures and processes may be explained by institutional
theory which is defined as “a way of thinking about formal organisation
structures and … the social processes through which these structures
develop” (Dillard et al 2004, p. 508). Institutional pressures – which
often result in homogeneous organisational structures (DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983, p. 147) such as the development and acceptance of
governing boards as the preferred form of organisational governance
control – illustrate the concept of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983, p. 148).
This paper will focus on institutional isomorphism, which is explained by
three different mechanisms: coercive, mimetic and normative (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987; Pollitt, 2001; Dillard et al., 2004).
Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressures
exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are
dependent (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Dillard et al., 2004). In the
Commonwealth public sector, the main organisations that apply coercive
pressure are the three central agencies, the Departments of Finance
and Deregulation, Treasury and Prime Minister and Cabinet. These
central agencies direct many of the processes, practices and policies
required to be implemented by other government organisations.
Mimetic isomorphism is a process that takes place when an organisation
attempts to imitate a more successful organisation (DiMaggio and
8
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Powell, 1983, p. 151; Dillard et al., 2004, p. 509). This view is supported
by Oliver (1991), who explains that it is expected organisations will
conform to certain practices when the practices are validated externally
by other organisations (p. 148). The move to new managerialism and
the adoption of processes and practices associated with this new
managerialism in the public sector could be considered the result of
mimetic isomorphic processes.
Normative isomorphism focuses on processes of professionalisation.
Professional staff undergo relatively uniform training, and then carry the
ideas they learnt to the different organisations which employ them
(Pollitt, p. 938). An example of normative isomorphism is where
professionally qualified accountants may drive to adopt within their
organisation new techniques which they learnt in their studies, such as
activity based costing7 and balanced score card8.
Institutional theory also suggests that in organisations, in response to
institutional pressures, there may be significant differences between their
formal structure and their actual day-to-day work activities (Meyer and
Rowan, 1977, p. 342). This deliberate act is defined as de-coupling
however it is important to note that de-coupling is not a mechanism to
hide dishonest practices but rather it is seen as an attempt to maintain
some rough equilibrium between inconsistent norms (Brignall and
Modell, 2000, p. 300).
Institutional theory offers a satisfying explanation of the move over the
past decade to a “new managerialism” in the public sector (Jackson and
Lapsley, 2003, p. 360). Based on a culture of performance (Hoque and
Moll, 2001; Boxall, 1998) and an increased focus on accountability,
efficiency and effectiveness, this new managerialism requires public
sector organisations to be more responsive to the needs [real and
perceived] of government (Hoque and Moll, 2001; Boxall, 1998). Global
expectations of improved productivity and competitiveness in the public

7

A cost accounting system in which costs are assigned to products based on cost
drivers for the various production activities required to produce a product or
service (Hoggett, Edwards and Medlin 2006, p. 1107)

8

A measurement-based management system which aligns business activities with
the vision and strategies of an organisation (Hoggett, Edwards and Medlin 2006,
p. 1108).
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sector (Boxall, 1998) have been institutionalised in Australian public
sector practice. The following empirical data is reflective of the impact of
institutional pressures that CSAs have been exposed to in the public
sector’s misguided path to legitimacy.

Empirical Tests
Sample Selection
There are 71 statutory authorities which are CSAs, according to the
definition in the CAC Act 1997. Of these, 25 are defined as material
entities, as they comprise 99% of revenues, expenses, assets and
liabilities of all the CSAs (DOFA, 2007). From the 25 material CSAs, six
were eliminated, leaving 19 for this review. The 19 remaining CSAs
(refer to appendix 1) are part of 11 different Commonwealth government
portfolios. The six CSAs eliminated from the study include the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission, which was excluded because it
operates under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997.
The Australian Government Solicitor, Comcare, and the Civil Aviation
Authority were excluded as they have a “single person at the apex of the
body rather than a multi-member board” (DOFA, 2007). The Australian
Industry Development Corporation and the Coal Mining Industry (Long
Service Leave Funding) Corporation were also excluded as their
operations and structure are significantly different from the other CSAs.

Results
Number of Directors
The 19 CSAs in the review had a total of 176 directors, with
approximately 9 directors per CSA board. This was consistent with the
findings of the Higgs (2003, p. 22) report, which stated that “the board
should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and experience is
appropriate for the requirement of the business”. One of the better
practice recommendations of the Uhrig Report (2003) is that board size
“should be developed taking into consideration factors such as an
entity’s size, complexity, risk of operations and the needs of the board”.
The ASX Corporate Governance Principle 2 recommends that the size of
the board should be conducive to encouraging expedient and efficient
decision making (ASX 2003, p. 22). The Uhrig and Higgs reports, as
10
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well as the ASX principles, indicate that board size should be based on
individual organisational needs rather than a prescribed definite size.
Another important recommendation of these reports is that the majority
of directors should be non-executive directors who are generally
considered to be independent of the executive and “free from any
business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the
exercise of their independent judgement” (Higgs, 2003, p. 36).
In addition to the information about the number of directors, the 2005–06
Annual Reports for each of the 19 CSAs were used to collect the
following information: mix of executive and non-executive directors;
gender of directors; highest level of qualification of directors; average
length of service of directors; remuneration of non-executive directors;
and number of other directorships. This data is presented in the
following section.
Mix of Executive and Non Executive Directors
Of the 176 directors, 15 are executives of the organisation and 161
(91%) are non-executive directors (NED). The non-executive director
does not hold an executive or management position in the organisation
and could therefore be considered to bring to the board a higher degree
of independence. Non-executive directors typically participate in longterm decision making, contribute external business expertise, identify
potential business opportunities, and monitor the actions of company
executives (Pass, 2004, Long et al., 2005; Higgs, 2003). However, of
these 161 directors, 23 are also current senior public servants or
members of parliament and are considered to be non-independent nonexecutive directors. That is, while these directors are not executives of
the organisation, they have conflicting interests in relation to their
position on the board in areas such as funding and the setting of the
strategic direction of the organisation. For example, Senator George
Bandis (member of the Government) and Martin Ferguson MP (member
of the Opposition) are both on the board of the National Library and their
presence would be to ensure the interests of Parliament are
represented. However, as members of different political parties, they
may need to be excluded from a number of board decisions, such as the
implementation of government policy, where their roles as members of

11

Volume 14, Number 1, 2008

Accounting, Accountability & Performance

specific political parties could result in a conflict of role9. There are
currently two Departmental Secretaries10 holding directorships on the
boards of organisations within their portfolios. These are Ms Lisa Paul,
Secretary of the Department of Science, Education and Training, and Ms
Helen Williams, Secretary of the Department of Communications,
Information Technology and the Arts. Ms Paul is a director on the board
of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation,
which is a CSA within her portfolio. Ms Helen Williams sits on the
boards of the National Library of Australia and the Australian Sports
Commission; again, both of these come under the umbrella of her
portfolio department. This high level of non-independent directors was
criticised in the Uhrig (2003, p. 13) report because representational
appointments have the potential to place the success of the entity at risk.
Further, it has been suggested that having the portfolio secretary as a
member of the board, regardless of whether or not he or she has voting
rights, is “a further complication, particularly when financial matters are
at stake” (Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005, pp. 56–57). Both Ms Paul
and Ms Williams assist in preparing and signing-off the Annual Reports
and Budget Estimates of their CSAs and, as departmental secretaries,
are required to consider and approve funding requests from these same
statutory authorities.
Howard and Seth-Purdie (2005, p. 62) describe this “independence
paradox” as an interesting position where “a secretary would be
simultaneously policy advisor to the minister, major client of the authority
and authority board member”. They (Howard and Seth-Purdie, 2005, p.
61) further assert that new public sector non-executive directors who
come from the private sector initially struggle to come to terms with the
processes and practices of public sector organisations, as they lack the
exposure to public sector norms. This situation contributes to the
independence paradox, as the non-executive directors, in the course of

9

Conflicts of role arise when an officer is required to fulfil multiple roles that may
be in conflict with each other to some degree. Unless properly handled, such
conflicts can impair the quality of working relationships across government
organisations and lead to a loss of credibility and effectiveness (ANAO 2003c).

10

The Secretary of a Department is responsible for managing [i.e. is head of] the
Department and must advise the Agency Minister in matters relating to the
Department (PSA Act 1999, ss. 57.1). That is, a Secretary is the equivalent of
the CEO of a private sector organisation.

12
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fulfilling their responsibilities, rely heavily on the information and
guidance provided by the same executives from whom they are to said
to be independent (Hooghiemstra and van Manen, 2004).
Figure 1
Mix of Directors
Non
Independent
Non-Exec
13%

Non
Exec
78%

Exec
9%

The results from figure 1 are consistent with the recommendations of the
Higgs report that “at least half of the members of the board, excluding
the chairman, should be independent non-executive directors” (2003, p.
35) and the ASX Corporate Governance Principles that “a majority of the
board should be independent directors” (2003, p. 19).
Gender of Directors
The proportion of female non-executive directors (29%) is significantly
higher than comparable studies of non-executive directors in the private
sector. Kang, Cheng and Gray’s 2007 study of the top 100 Australian
companies in 2003 indicated that 10% of non-executive directors were
female (p. 200), where Cortese and Bowrey’s 2007 study of the top 50
Australian listed companies in 2006 found 16% were female.
Even more significant than the larger proportion of female non-executive
directors is the fact that all statutory authority boards in the study had
one or more female non-executive directors. The Kang, Cheng and
Gray study showed in 2003 that, of the top 100 Australian companies,
67% had a female director (p. 200) while the Cortese and Bowrey 2007
13
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study indicated 83% of the top 50 Australian listed companies had one
or more female board members.
Figure 2

Gender Proportion of NED Directors

Female
29%
Male
71%

Gender Proportion of ED Directors

Male
87%
Female
13%
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Along with gender, age is also a much measured characteristic of
directors of boards. The Cortese and Bowrey (2007) and the Kang,
Cheng and Gray (2007) studies both measure and discuss the age mix
of directors; however, unlike the annual reports of private sector
companies, the annual reports of CSAs do not disclose the ages of the
directors. The ethnicity of directors is also not explicitly disclosed in the
annual reports. This information would be useful in determining the level
of representation of the various minority groups in society, which in turn
would demonstrate the breadth of accountability to the Australian public.
Directors’ Levels of Education
The level of education of 113 directors could be determined from the
various CSAs’ annual reports (64% of the sample). Figure 3 shows the
highest level of formal qualifications these 113 directors have attained.
Figure 3
Qualifications
Diploma
4%
Post
Graduate
66%
Graduate
30%

It is apparent from the data that most directors have some level of
tertiary qualifications. Of the directors with post graduate qualifications,
a significant proportion (25%) have been awarded PhDs, with the
remainder holding Masters degrees and/or professional qualifications
such as CPA Australia status. This result can be explained due to the
normative isomorphic process where the selection of appropriate people
to become non-executive directors is guided by their level of perceived
15
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suitability, based on their qualifications and membership of particular
organisations.
Length of Service
The length of service of non-executive directors has also been identified
as a possible key indicator of board performance and the level of
director independence. The ASX listing rules suggest that nonexecutive directors should serve on a board only for a period of time
where it would not interfere with the director’s ability to act in the best
interests of the company (ASX, 2003, p. 20). This view is reflected in
Uhrig’s (2003, p. 53) report, which suggested a maximum board service
period be set to allow for appropriate rotation of directors. Higgs (2003,
p. 53) concluded that non-executive directors could appropriately serve
two three-year terms with a company and suggested that it would be of
questionable value for a non-executive director to serve a longer term as
a non-executive director...

Figure 4
# of
Directors

Length of Board Membership

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Other

Years

Figure 4 shows the average length of service of non-executive directors
in the sample statutory authorities to be 4.5 years, which is similar to the
16
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findings of the comparable study of ASX 50 corporations (Cortese and
Bowrey, 2007). There is, however, some concern, as approximately 8%
of the non-executive directors in the sample have served as nonexecutive directors on their respective boards for 10 or more years. This
length of service could present problems, particularly in relation to the
independence of non-executive directors, since “the substantial length of
time served by some non-executive directors could reasonably be
perceived to interfere with the independence of these board members”
(ASX, 2003, p. 20).
Director Remuneration
The most obvious difference between non-executive directors of CSAs
and of private sector companies is the level of remuneration for nonexecutive directors. Cortese and Bowrey (2007) found that the majority
of the ASX 50 companies provided their non-executive directors with
average remuneration in excess of $140,000. Figure 5 shows that the
majority (68%) of non-executive directors in the sample received
remuneration between $15,000 and $45,000 per year, with the average
level of remuneration being $32,000.

Figure 5
#
60

Number of NEDs within specific remuneration ranges

50
40
30
20
10
0
1 - 15

15 - 30
30 - 45
45 - 60
Average Remuneration Range ($000’s)
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Excluded from the above figure is the average level of remuneration for
the non-executive directors of the Reserve Bank of Australia board. This
is because the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 2005–06 Annual Report
discloses in the financial notes (Note 12, p. 85) only the consolidated
remuneration of key management personnel, which includes the
Governor and Deputy Governor, eight non-executive Reserve Bank of
Australia’s Board members, five non-executive Payments System Board
members and five senior staff. Even though the Reserve Bank of
Australia is a statutory authority operating under the CAC Act 1997, it
was not possible to identify separately the remuneration of its board
members. This lack of clear disclosure of director remuneration of the
Reserve Bank of Australia is not in accordance with ASX Corporate
Governance Principle 9 (ASX, 2003), which requires the disclosure of
non-executive directors’ remuneration to be clear and adequately
distinguished from the remuneration structure applied to company
executives.
Also not included in Figure 5 is the remuneration of the non-executive
directors who are also senior public servants and members of
parliament, as they do not receive any remuneration for their
directorships on statutory authorities boards. This is generally made
clear in the Notes to the Financial Statements. For example, the
National Library of Australia 2005–06 Annual Report Note 13 (p. 115)
states “Parliamentary members of Council do not receive any
remuneration from the Library for their service on Council”.
The average remuneration of non-executive directors who had been a
director for one year was $29,000, while those who had been a director
for six or more years was $31,000, indicating no correlation between
non-executive director remuneration and the length of time they serve on
the boards of material CSAs.
Number of Directorships
The data collected in Figure 6 shows that 84 directors of statutory
authorities (48% of the sample) held at least one other directorship, with
70 (43%) of non-executive directors holding more than one directorship.
However, of all the directors in the sample, only five held at least one
other directorship with another material statutory authority. Two of these
were non-independent non-executive directors: Mr Mark Paterson,
Secretary of the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (DITR)
18
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and Ms Helen Williams, Secretary of the Department of
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA). This
relatively high percentage (43%) of non-executive directors holding at
least one directorship in both the private and the public sectors tends to
indicate that the non-executive directors of CSAs are able to contribute a
significant amount of private sector corporate experience to the boards
of CSAs. This is a clear example of both how institutional pressures to
have access to the CSAs and how mimetic and normative isomorphic
processes are in a position to be internally exerted. It could also be
considered that this level of ‘private sector’ experienced non-executive
directors will contribute to legitimising the existence, role and
responsibilities of CSA’s governing board of directors.
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Discussion
The boards of directors of CSAs are unique in a number of ways when
compared to the boards of private sector organisations. On the surface
they appear similar, for example their size and composition, but beneath
the surface are a range of different characteristics and requirements.
The initial surface similarities could be explained by institutional theory
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as the result of coercive isomorphic processes, with the CAC Act 1997
specifying certain governance requirements of CSAs. In the private
sector there is a definite drive to increase the proportion of nonexecutive directors to improve the level of, or at least the appearance of,
independence of the board from the management of the organisation11.
However, independence does not appear to be a characteristic either
required or encouraged of directors in statutory authorities.
The findings from this study indicate that the proportion of non-executive
directors on the governing boards of directors in CSAs is comparable to
if not higher than public corporation boards, and therefore these public
sector organisations could actually be perceived as being more
compliant with the ASX’s Principles of Good Corporate Governance.
However in reality the responsible Minister selects and appoints (or
recommends for appointment) governing board members, which negates
the independence of these public sector governing board directors. The
high level of institutional pressure from the responsible Minister supports
the notion that the public sector has adopted this governance structure
from the private sector, not to improve corporate governance, but to
legitimise the organisations in the sector.
This institutional pressure from the Minister also results in the decoupling of the governance structure, as the board appears to be
relatively highly independent, due to the presence of a high proportion of
non-executive directors [who are usually considered independent].
However, because they are appointed by those who are not independent
of the CSA, the reality of their existence is different from the appearance
they present. So why the need for de-coupling? The answer seems to
be the wholesale adoption of new managerialism philosophy in the
public sector. The myth that private sector practices, for example the
ASX’s
Good
Corporate
Governance
and
Best
Practice
Recommendations, are required if the public sector is to operate
efficiently and effectively. The inclusion of governing boards of directors
in the corporate governance structures of public sector organisations
appears to be in line with Boxall’s explanation that the main objectives of
new managerialism are the encouragement of a culture of [board and

11

Principle 2 of the ASX’s 2003 Corporate Governance Council Principles of Good
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations outlines the
suggested structure of the board of directors such as composition, size and
commitment to adequately discharge its responsibilities and duties (ASX, 2003).
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organisational] performance (1998, p. 18) and the perceived need of the
public sector to improve its accountability (Guthrie, 1998, p. 2; Barton,
2005, p. 138). Yet the de-coupling of the governing board of directors
with the authority and power of the responsible Minister seems to imply
that government itself does not trust the operation and function of the
governing board of directors which it has adopted from the private
sector.
Besides having executive and non-executive directors, some boards of
CSAs also include non-independent non-executive directors who are
literally representational directors. These directors are either senior
public servants or members of parliament. Their role is to represent the
government or parliament and to protect the interests of these bodies,
rather than to participate independently in the governance of the CSA.
Their presence may be explained as a function of the coercive
isomorphic process.
In addition to appointing board members, the responsible Minister can
also direct the board to comply with general government policies (ss.28
of the CAC Act 1997) as well as determine the overall strategy of the
CSA (Uhrig, 2003, p. 35). This creates a situation where there is very
little real independence and autonomy of the board. Uhrig (2003, p. 23)
commented that the power to act is essential to a board’s ability to
govern effectively. However, due to the powers of the responsible
Minister, it appears that the boards of CSAs are not able to govern
effectively as they do not have the power to act with autonomy.
There is no doubt corporate governance structures are critical in the
public sector; however, as the environment is so different to the private
sector, the need for and value of similar governance arrangements is
questionable. Why adopt private sector governance practices when
some of the most spectacular corporate collapses have occurred
recently in spite of their governance structures? It could be argued that
the presence of implementing similar governance arrangements is based
on the misconception that the private sector is more efficient and
effective, rather than on improving public sector governance. The Uhrig
Report (2003) suggested that CSAs focused on regulating or service
delivery objectives would be better served having a Chief Executive
Officer reporting directly to the Minister rather than a board. Bartos
(2005) reflected that, should the Uhrig model be accepted, many
statutory authorities including Commonwealth Scientific Industrial
Research Organisation, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Special
21
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Broadcasting Services Corporation, National Gallery, National Library,
National Museum and Australian War Memorial (p. 97) would no longer
have a board. However, at present these statutory authorities still have
governing boards. The continuing presence of governing boards in
these public sector organisations can be considered to be the result of
the impact of various institutional pressures which have been placed on
the CSAs, with the goal of contributing to the legitimacy of the board for
both the government and Australian public.

Conclusion
It can be argued that the adoption of private sector practices by the
public sector can be seen, not as an attempt to improve efficiency,
effectiveness and performance, which are the objectives of the new
managerialism in the public sector, but rather as a need for public sector
organisations to legitimise themselves within society (Hoque, 2005, p.
370). The strong belief that private sector organisational practices and
structures are superior to public sector practices and structures has led
to various institutional pressures being exerted, both internal and
externally, on public sector organisations, with a mix of results. One
such institutional pressure is the belief that good corporate governance
is based on the presence of a governing board consisting of a particular
mix of directors.
This study has shown that the majority of CSAs have a governing board
consisting of both executive and non-executive directors, which is
consistent with private sector organisations. Indeed, based on the data
above, the boards of CSAs appear to be more in line with the
recommendations from bodies such as the Australian Stock Exchange
than private sector organisations are. However, while it appears the
presence of CSA governing boards should improve the corporate
governance of the organisations, and in turn increase their legitimacy in
this era of new managerialism, the structures behind the boards and the
legislated roles of the directors contradict some of these aspects, such
as independence. The increased legitimacy of these CSAs, associated
with the presence of governing boards, can be considered as a part of
the de-coupling mechanism that persists throughout the public sector.
That is, while these CSRs have governing boards that undertake many
of the roles of private sector boards, the real power to set the strategic,
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financial and operational directions of the CSRs is not in the hands of
the directors but in the hands of the responsible ministers.
This study has drawn data from the boards of “material” CSAs. Further
research could extend this study to include the board compositions of
non-material statutory authorities. This would be particularly interesting,
as materiality is defined according to the value of assets and liabilities
and not to the social value of the services provided. As these
organisations operate in the same environment as the material CSAs, it
would be interesting to examine whether the financial situation of
organisations influences the composition of their governing boards or
whether there are other influencing factors at play.
A future research project could perform an analysis of the changing
board structures of the material CSAs since the enactment of the CAC
Act 1997. Such a research project would provide an interesting account
of the impact of this Act in line with the public sector’s move to new
managerialism and the corresponding increased focus on public sector
organisation performance.
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Appendix 1
Statutory Authorities Included in the Analysis

Statutory Authority

Portfolio

Grains Research and Development
Corporation

Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forestry

Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

Australian Postal Corporation

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

Australian Sports Commission

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

National Gallery of Australia

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

National Library of Australia

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

National Museum of Australia

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

Special Broadcasting Service Corporation
(SBS)

Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts

Defence Housing Australia (DHA)

Defence

Australian Nuclear Science and Technology
Organisation (ANSTO)

Education, Science and Training

Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisation (CSIRO)

Education, Science and Training

Indigenous Business Australia

Employment and Workplace
Relations

29

Volume 14, Number 1, 2008

Accounting, Accountability & Performance

Statutory Authority

Portfolio

Export Finance and Insurance Corporation

Foreign Affairs and Trade

Australian Hearing Services

Human Services

Tourism Australia

Industry, Tourism and
Resources

Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation

Treasury

Reserve Bank of Australia

Treasury

Australian War Memorial

Veteran’s Affairs

Airservices Australia

Transport and Regional Services
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Appendix 2
The Uhrig Report 2003 –
Summary of Better Practice Guidance for Boards

1. Board size should be developed taking into consideration factors
such as an entity’s size, complexity, risk of operations and the
needs of the board.
2. Committees are a useful mechanism for the board to enhance its
effectiveness through further detailed oversight and supervision of
the management of risks that are critical to the success of the
entity. Committees should be used only for this purpose.
3. In getting the best from boards, appropriately experienced
directors are critical to good governance.
4. Representational appointments to boards have the potential to
place the success of the entity at risk.
5. Responsible Ministers should issue appointment letters detailing
government expectations of directors.
6. Maximum board service periods allow for a structured rotation of
directors.
7. All boards should have orientation programs and directors should
have the opportunity for ongoing professional development.
8. Annual assessments of the board need to occur to ensure
government gets the best from the board.
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